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Abstract
Cluster hash tables (CHTs) are a key persistent-storage
component of many large-scale Internet services due to
their high performance and scalability. We show that a
correctly-designed CHT can also be as easy to manage
as a farm of stateless servers. Specifically, we trade away
some consistency to obtain reboot-based recovery that
is simple, maintains full data availability, and only has
modest impact on performance. This simplifies manage-
ment in two ways. First, it simplifies failure detection by
lowering the cost of acting on false positives, allowing
us to use simple but aggressive statistical techniques to
quickly detect potential failures and node degradations;
even when a false alarm is raised or when rebooting will
not fix the problem, attempting recovery by rebooting is
relatively non-intrusive to system availability and perfor-
mance. Second, it allows us to re-cast online repartition-
ing as failure plus recovery, simplifying dynamic scaling
and capacity planning. These properties make it possible
for the system to be continuously self-adjusting, a key
property of self-managing, autonomic systems.
1 The case for cheap recovery
In large-scale Internet services, cluster hash tables
(CHTs) have emerged as a critical component in the over-
all state-storage solution (see Figure 1). One primary
advantage of a CHT is its ability to scale linearly to
achieve high performance [15]. For this reason, single-
key-lookup data like Yahoo! user profiles and metadata
for Amazon catalog items is stored in CHTs [35, 42].
Another common design pattern involves using a CHT
as a base storage layer and placing more complex query
logic in the application. Inktomi’s search engine ac-
cesses several CHTs on each query, the largest of which
is a one trillion entry table that maps a word’s MD5
hash to a list of document IDs for pages containing that
word [5]. In Ninja [16], atomic compare-and-swap is
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Figure 1: Tiered Internet application that uses persistent hash tables as
part of its overall storage solution.
implemented on top of a CHT to increase programming
generality. Although databases make up its storage layer,
Ebay performs complex queries that involve cross-node
joins and foreign-key constraints in the application to
achieve greater scalability [17]. A third type of design
involves storing semi-persistent session state in a RAM-
only CHT [29]. These examples show that certain types
of data do not require the full generality of databases and
can instead be stored in a CHT for improved scalability
and performance.
Not only do CHTs provide scalability and perfor-
mance, but as this paper shows, CHTs can be designed
to simplify two important challenges in persistent-state
management. The first challenge is fast, accurate fail-
ure detection. In the presence of all types of transient
failures, including “fail-stutter” behavior where perfor-
mance gradually degrades [2], fast failure detection is at
odds with accurate failure detection. Reacting quickly
to potential failures leads to false positives, while wait-
ing to collect enough observations to accurately identify
failures results in a higher mean-time-to-repair. The sec-
ond challenge is accurately predicting future load for ca-
pacity planning. In a cluster of stateless servers, fluid,
reactive scaling avoids having to predict load far in the
future [9]. For persistent state, however, the adminis-
tration and availability cost of repartitioning data makes
scaling more expensive and places higher importance on
accurate load prediction.
We demonstrate that failure detection and load predic-
tion need not be so accurate if recovery can be made ex-
tremely cheap, by which we mean predictably fast and
having predictably small impact on system availability
and performance. First, cheap recovery lowers the cost of
acting on false positives so that effective failure detection
is not contingent on accuracy. Second, cheap recovery
is the basis for our automatic online repartitioning algo-
rithm, which lowers scaling costs. We apply two design
principles for achieving cheap recovery at the expense of
consistency, but deliver a consistency model with well-
defined guarantees that is appropriate for a large range
of CHT-based Internet applications, including those de-
scribed above.
The main practical benefit of cheap recovery is re-
duced state management costs. In current systems, the
administration costs already dwarf hardware and soft-
ware costs. With a typical company requiring one ad-
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ministrator per 1-10 terabytes and data demands grow-
ing to the petabyte range, simplifying state management
is increasingly important, especially for Internet ser-
vices, which must deliver content from massive datasets
for fractions of a penny per access [14]. Traditional
databases can take minutes to recover from a failure,
and scaling them up requires administrator intervention
and nontrivial downtime [18]. Even in systems that
mask failures with failover nodes, when read-one-write-
all (ROWA) and primary-secondary replication schemes
are used, recovery may involve freezing writes while
copying missed updates to the recovering node [30].
These issues are not unique to databases, but exist in
CHTs as well [15]; however, this paper shows how CHTs
can be designed to avoid these recovery and scaling pit-
falls. Our contributions are therefore, as follows:
1. We show that cheap recovery, by lowering the cost
of acting on false positives, enables the use of unop-
timized anomaly-detection techniques and aggres-
sive restart policies for effective failure detection.
2. We present an online repartitioning algorithm that
recasts repartitioning as failure plus recovery, al-
lowing the reuse of existing mechanisms for dy-
namic provisioning of resources to deal with work-
load changes and heterogeneous node performance.
3. We identify two design principles that trade con-
sistency for cheap recovery and use them to build
DStore (Decoupled Storage), a CHT that can serve
as a testbed for measuring the failure handling and
resource provisioning benefits of cheap recovery as
well as for future work on evaluating the effective-
ness of various failure detection techniques.
In the rest of this paper, we discuss the principles and
tradeoffs for achieving cheap recovery (Sections 2-3); we
provide implementation details and evaluate recovery be-
havior (4-5); we describe and evaluate mechanisms for
failure detection and repartitioning (6-7); and we con-
clude by discussing future and related work.
2 Two principles for cheap recovery
We follow two design principles for making recovery
cheap. The first principle is to tolerate replica inconsis-
tency by using quorum-based replication [13]. In the ba-
sic quorum scheme, reads and writes are performed on a
majority of the replicas. Since the read set and write set
necessarily intersect, when we use timestamps to com-
pare the values returned on a read, the most up-to-date
value is returned. Thus, quorums allow some replicas to
store stale data while the system returns up-to-date data.
What this means in practice is that a failed replica does
not need to execute special-case recovery code to freeze
writes and copy missed updates.
Although a wealth of prior work uses quorums
to maintain availability under network partitions and
Byzantine failures [8, 36]1, few real-life systems do this,
perhaps because these failure modes are too rare [43].
Instead, we use quorums to simplify the mechanisms for
adding new nodes and rebooting failed nodes, which are
frequent occurrences in Internet services. The main cost
of quorum-based replication is storage overhead, which
we address in the next section.
The second principle is to avoid locking and trans-
actional logging by using single-phase operations for
updates. In replicated state stores that use two-phase
commit, recovery involves reading the log and complet-
ing in-progress transactions by contacting other repli-
cas. Meanwhile, replicas holding data locks for in-
progress transactions may be forced to block until recov-
ery is complete to reestablish full data availability. Us-
ing single-phase operations, we avoid locking data dur-
ing failures and cleaning up those locks on recovery. The
main cost of single-phase operations is a weaker (but
well-defined) consistency model, which we also discuss
in the next section.
Our design principles point to two forms of coupling
that exist among replicas – the strict consistency among
replicas in ROWA and the locking required for two-phase
commit. By removing this coupling, we make recovery
simpler and less intrusive.
3 Cheap recovery tradeoffs
To understand the tradeoffs involved in using quorums
with single-phase writes, it helps to have a basic under-
standing of DStore’s architecture (Figure 2).
Dlibs (DStore libraries)
LAN
Dlib
brick
brick
brickhash table API
Dlib
App Servers
Figure 2: DStore architecture
expose a hash table API
and service requests by
acting as the coordinator
for distributed quorum op-
erations on bricks, which
store persistent data. Based on typical uses of CHTs, we
assume the following usage model: When a user issues a
request to the Internet service, the request is forwarded to
a random application server, which performs one or more
hash table operations on the Dlib to fulfill the request2.
For the discussion on consistency, we consider consis-
tency from the point of view of individual Dlibs making
multiple requests as well as from the point of the view
of the end-user; however, if a single end-user issues re-
quests from two separate browser windows, we consider
each window to be a separate user.
To handle a request, the Dlib first identifies the bricks
responsible for storing the given key (replica group). For
writes, the Dlib issues the write to all bricks in the replica
group, and waits for a majority to respond. As is typical
1We reference two survey papers because even a partial list of ref-
erences would fill entire pages.
2Although session affinity is often used to route all of a user’s re-
quests to the same application server [22], we do not rely on this mech-
anism.
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with hash tables, writes completely overwrite the current
value. For reads, the Dlib queries a random majority of
bricks in the replica group and uses timestamps to de-
termine which value to return. As in Phalanx [32], be-
fore returning, if the timestamps do not match, the Dlib
issues read-repair operations with the up-to-date value-
timestamp pair to bricks that returned stale values; this
ensures that a majority of the bricks have the up-to-date
value upon returning from the read.
3.1 Quorums and storage overhead
Quorums require a higher degree of replication than
ROWA to achieve an equivalent level of fault tolerance
because tolerating N failures requiresN +1 bricks with
ROWA and 2N + 1 bricks with quorums. To capture the
entire cost, however, we must consider common failure
scenarios and clarify what it means to “tolerate failures.”
In a cluster, failures are typically either independent or
very widespread (as in a site outage) [21]. Under this as-
sumption, tolerating one failure per replica group is suf-
ficient for tolerating most failure scenarios that cluster-
based solutions can handle. Furthermore, when consider-
ing overall availability, one must take into account avail-
ability during recovery. In ROWA, bringing the failed
brick up to date causes a big dip in write availability [15];
whereas in quorums with read-repair, the cost of recov-
ery is spread out over time as on-demand repair opera-
tions cause a slight dip in write throughput and an in-
crease in read latency for some reads. Therefore, if one
needs to meet a certain minimum level of service, us-
ing quorums can actually make provisioning for failures
simpler and less costly.
Quorums also require a greater number of replica
groups to match the read performance of ROWA. On a
read, 1 brick is queried in ROWA while ⌈(N + 1)/2⌉
bricks are queried in quorums. To alleviate this, we use a
read-timestamp optimization in which we read the value-
timestamp pair from one replica and read only the times-
tamp from the remaining replicas. This technique is ef-
fective if the value returned is up-to-date and if reading a
timestamp is faster than reading the actual value. Since
writes are issued to all bricks, the value returned is usu-
ally up-to-date, which avoids having to issue a second re-
quest to obtain an up-to-date value. Furthermore, when
the value size is large compared to the 8-byte timestamp
size, most timestamps in the working set can be cached in
the brick’s RAM. Under these conditions, the overhead
of reading timestamps from an in-memory cache is in-
significant compared to the cost of reading a value from
disk. If, instead, timestamps do not fit in memory, the
resulting performance penalty can be resolved by adding
more replica groups; however, since administration costs
make up a large fraction of the overall storage cost [14],
the cost increase is offset by the simplified management
cheap recovery provides.
3.2 Single-phase writes and consistency
The main challenge in using single-phase operations
is ensuring consistency. Two-phase commit guarantees
sequential consistency [26], which has two requirements:
1. write atomicity – when a write returns, it has either
completely succeeded or completely failed
2. consistent ordering – there is a global ordering of
operations that is consistent with the order as seen
by individual clients
Distributed consensus, which is necessary for atomic-
ity, has been proven to require at least two phases [31].
Therefore, we aim to guarantee consistent ordering along
with a set of well-defined semantics for non-atomic up-
dates. In particular, suppose a writew is issued to replace
vorig by vnew . Any read issued between w and the next
attempted write have the following guarantees. If the re-
turn status of w is:
• success ⇒ reads return vnew
• failure ⇒ reads return vorig
• unknown⇒ reads can return vnew or vorig . If vorig
is returned, no user has read vnew, but a future read
by the same or different user might return vnew. If
vnew is returned, no user will read vorig in the future
In the rest of this section, we first discuss how we deal
with concurrency and failures to provide these consis-
tent ordering guarantees. Then we provide examples of
Internet services for which these consistency guarantees
support an appropriate usage model.
3.2.1 Write concurrency
To handle concurrent writes, Dlibs determine the
global update order by generating a globally-unique
physical timestamp (local time, IP address) on each up-
date. Following the Thomas Write Rule [40], bricks exe-
cute the update only if the new timestamp is more recent
than the current timestamp. This way, bricks “agree”
on the update order without explicit coordination; how-
ever, since timestamps are generated from local clocks,
we must be careful to avoid lost writes, in which a more
recent write is effectively overwritten by a write that oc-
curred in the past:
U1: w1(k,a,ts1)
U2: a←r1(k) w2(k,b,ts2) a←r2(k)
✲ time
Since r2(k) returns the previously-wrtten value a, it must
be the case that ts2 < ts1 resulting inw2(k, b, ts2) being
lost; however, w2 → w1 is inconsistent with the order
as seen by U2. To prevent inconsistency, bricks return
a timestamp error for w2 along with the current times-
tamp ts1. This allows the Dlib for U2 to update its clock,
generate a new timestamp, and retry the request.
3
Synchronizing clocks improves performance by re-
ducing the occurrence of timestamp errors. When clocks
are synchronized, in situations where two users issue re-
quests at approximately the same time, it is often accept-
able to ignore a lost write without returning an error:
U1: w1(k,a,ts1)
U2: w2(k,b,ts2) a←r1(k)
✲ time
Here, w2 → w1 does not violate the order as seen by ei-
ther user. Furthermore, since we assume that each user’s
request is handled by a single Dlib acting independently
of other Dlibs, w1 and w2 are “unordered” according to
Lamport’s ordering rules [25]. To take advantage of this,
we configure bricks with a small tolerance (∆ts) and al-
low a write to be lost without returning an error if the
diference in timestamps is smaller than∆ts. Thus, bricks
execute the update if ts1 < ts2, return a timestamp error
if ts1−ts2 > ∆ts, and otherwise, disregard the write and
do not return an error. Since ordering issues arise only
when a write follows a read, we set ∆ts = 1ms, which
is based on the minimum network roundtrip time. Com-
bined with NTP [33] to synchronize clocks to within 1
millisecond, this eliminates almost all timestamp errors;
however, even if clocks cannot be synchronized, correct-
ness is not compromised.
3.2.2 Read-write concurrency
If user U1 updates a
0←r3(k)
0←r1(k)
1←r2(k)
w1(k,1)
B1 B2 B3U1 U2
k=0
Figure 3: Delayed write
value while another user
U2 issues a read, U2
may witness a partial
write where the write has
reached some, but not a
majority of the bricks.
When this occurs, de-
pending on which bricks
are queried on a read,
different values are re-
turned, which can cause ordering inconsistencies like the
one shown in Figure 3. In the figure, the unlabelled time-
line next to the user’s timeline represents a random Dlib
that may be different for each user request.
Figure 4 shows how
B1 B2 B3
k=0
commit point
w1(k,1)
w2(k,1)
1←r3(k)
0←r1(k)
1←r2(k)
U1 U2
Figure 4: Read repair
the read-repair mecha-
nism described earlier
resolves the partial
write problem by syn-
chronously committing
the new value before
returning from r2(k).
Once committed, all
future reads return the
new value. It follows
that reads issued prior to the commit point returned the
old value; otherwise, the new value would have been
committed already. Therefore, forcing a commit point
using read-repair resolves ordering inconsistencies that
can arise from concurrent reads and writes.
3.2.3 Dlib failures
With quorums, brick
B1 B2 B3
k=0
commit point
w1(k,1)
w2(k,1)
1←r3(k)
0←r1(k)
1←r2(k)
U1 U2
Figure 5: Dlib failure
failures do not affect
overall consistency, but
when Dlibs fail, partial
writes can occur. Like
with the read-write
concurrency example,
read repair resolves
partial writes due to
Dlib failures (Figure 5).
Analogous to recovery
in ROWA versus quorums, recovery in two phase versus
single phase is a tradeoff between bulk and incremental
recovery. In two-phase commit, locked data can cause
transactions to block and data to be unavailable for reads
and writes when a Dlib fails between phases. In DStore,
data remains available, and performance is slightly lower
after recovery as read-repair operations resolve partial
writes.
Under a fail-stop model, quorums with read-repair
guarantees linearizability [19], which is stronger than se-
quential consistency. One key to the proof [36] is that a
partial write can be serialized any time after a failure be-
cause the coordinator does not recover and no other party
knows when the write was actually issued. In DStore,
however, due to the assumed usage model, the “coordi-
nator” is not only the Dlib, but also includes the user who
issued the request. For this extended view of the coordi-
nator, the fail-stop assumption does not hold. Therefore,
we next consider how to provide consistent ordering for
the user that issues an update whose status is “unknown.”
When a Dlib or the ap-
B1 B2 B3
k=0
commit point
w1(k,1)
0←r1(k)
1←r2(k)
w2(k,1)
U1 U2
Figure 6: Dlib recovery
plication server it resides
on fails, the Web server
tier may retry the request
on a different application
server, or an application-
level error may cause the
user U1 to resubmit the
request via HTTP Retry-
After. In either case, any
partial write that occurred
is overwritten and U1 sees a consistent order; however, if
U1 performs a read to check the value, the old value may
be returned for awhile before the new value is committed
(Figure 6). Unlike U2, U1 knows when w1 was issued,
so it does not make sense for U1 to see the update being
committed at a later time. This is where DStore’s update
semantics violate atomicity; on a Dlib failure, the update
may have succeeded, failed, or may take effect at some
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later point in time.
To ensure that U1 sees
B1 B2 B3
k=0
commit point
w1(k,1)
w2(k,1)
1←r1(k)
1←r1(k)
U1 U2
Figure 7: Read all
a committed value after
a partial write, we must
record the fact that a
write is issued but has
not completed. Rather
than adding another phase
to the write protocol to
keep a write history on
the bricks, we effectively
store the “state” associated
with two-phase commit at the client. When U1 clicks
submit, client-side JavaScript code writes an in-progress
cookie on the client before the request is submitted.
Upon success, the server returns a replacement cookie
with the in-progress flag cleared. On a subsequent read,
the cookie is sent along with U1’s request. If cookie
in-progress flag is not cleared, the Dlib detects this and
reads the values from all bricks to find the most recent
value (Figure 7); that value is then written back to a ma-
jority of the bricks to commit any partial writes, reestab-
lishing the quorum invariant. As an alternative to using
the write-in-progress cookie, Internet services can imple-
ment other application-level techniques to force a user to
reissue the request before reading.
3.2.4 Two-phase commit revisited
The two techniques, quourms and single-phase up-
dates, are orthogonal. For example, one could use quo-
rums as the replication scheme, but use two-phase com-
mit to provide consistency. In DStore, we use single-
phase operations because our aim is to explore how
cheap we can make recovery to discover the resulting
properties. The following table summarizes the trade-
offs between using two-phase commit and single-phase
operations in DStore:
Property 2-phase commit Single-phase operations
Consistency Sequential consistency Consistent ordering
Recovery Read log to complete No special-case recovery
in-progress transactions
Availability Locking may cause requests No locking
to block during failures
Performance 2 synchronous log writes 1 synchronous update
2 roundtrips 1 roundtrip
Other costs None Read repair causes slight
performance degradation
Relies on client to store
write-in-progress cookie
3.2.5 Consistency guarantees
To conclude the discussion on trading consistency for
single-phase operations, we summarize DStore’s consis-
tency model. DStore enforces a total ordering consis-
tent with the partial order seen by individual Dlibs and
end users. More specifically, consider a user U1 who
performs a write w1(k, vnew) on a hash table in which
(k, vold) is a key-value pair. Assuming there are no sub-
sequent updates, reads return vnew if w1 returns success,
and vold if w1 returns failure. If the return status of w1 is
unknown, the read guarantees differ for different users.
If U1 issues the read, the write-in-progress cookie ac-
companies the request and the Dlib ensures that a partial
write is immediately committed so that the value is re-
turned is seen by all future reads. If another user U2 is-
sues the read, returning vold guarantees that no user has
read vnew , and returning vnew guarantees that no user
will read vold in the future.
To make the consistency discussion more concrete, we
list some applications for which DStore, and its current
consistency model, would and would not be appropriate:
• Single-user data (yes): user profiles, shopping carts,
workflow data for tax returns
• Single-producer multi-consumer (yes): catalog
metadata, search engine data (retailers/crawlers
make updates, which are reflected on the site)
• Multi-producer multi-consumer (probable): auction
bids (users submit bids, which other users see after
some delay) – requires application-level checks that
may require atomic compare-and-swap [16]
• Non-overwriting objects (no): workflow data for in-
surance claims (multiple users update separate por-
tions of a single document) – since updating stale
data on a quorum replica has undefined results use
ROWA instead
To summarize the tradeoffs described in this section,
for a small amount of storage overhead, one can use
quorums to simplify recovery and keep data available
throughout recovery. On top of that, for many Internet
applications for which the consistent ordering guaran-
tees described in this section are appropriate, one can use
single-phase operations to further simplify recovery and
keep all data available during a failure.
4 Implementation details
In this section, we discuss details of the DStore imple-
mentation. Recall that DStore is composed of two com-
ponents, Dlibs and bricks shown in Figure 2.
A Dlib is a Java class that presents a single-system
image with the consistency model detailed in the pre-
vious section. The Dlib API exposes put(key,value)
and get(key) methods where keys are 32-bit integers
and values are byte arrays. Dlibs service requests by
issuing read/write requests to bricks via TCP/IP socket
connections. In order to act as the coordinator for these
distributed operations, Dlibs maintain soft state metadata
about how data is partitioned and replicated. Finally,
Dlibs maintain request latency statistics, which are used
in making repartitioning decisions.
5
Bricks store persistent data accessed via the brick
API – write(key,value,ts), read val(key), and
read ts(key). For reading data, read val returns a
value-timestamp pair, while read ts returns only the
timestamp. On a write, the brick checksums the key-
value-timestamp object and writes it synchronously to
disk. Bricks also cache timestamps in an in-memory Java
Hashtable, and use the file system buffer cache to cache
values. Since the timestamp cache is updated after the
value is written to disk, if a brick fails while processing
a write, on a read, it conservatively returns a timestamp
that is no newer than the timestamp of the value on disk.
Currently, data is stored in files as fixed-length records
where the record size is configured at table-creation time.
Although this scheme is constrained by its fixed-length
nature, it is appropriate for datasets with low value-size
variance, such as Amazon’s catalog metadata database,
which has fixed-size entries [42]. Since the underlying
storage scheme is orthogonal to DStore’s design tech-
niques and is not critical for evaluating the system’s re-
covery and manageability, simplicity is the main reason
this scheme is used. Nevertheless, bricks are designed
so that it is easy to plug in different storage schemes.
For example, implementing wrapper code for Berkeley
DB [3] took less than an hour and changing storage
schemes takes a matter of seconds.
Bricks maintain two open TCP/IP socket connections
(send and receive) per Dlib, one control channel used
for initiating recovery and repartitioning, and three mes-
sage queues (read, put, and ts) serviced by individual
thread pools. Like router QoS queues, differentiating re-
quests enables administrators to provision resources and
maintain a minimum level of service for each request
type. Furthermore, differentiating longer-running write
requests from read requests reduces the service time vari-
ance, and subsequently, the average queuing delay [41].
4.1 Keyspace partitioning
Storage and throughput capacity is scaled by horizon-
tally partitioning the hash table across bricks. Each par-
tition is replicated on a set of bricks to form a replica
group, the unit upon which quorum operations are per-
formed. Keys are partitioned across replica groups based
on the keys’ least-significant bits, called the replica
group ID (RGID). Later we show how the keyspace can
be dynamically repartitioned without loss of availability
to compensate for an uneven workload or heterogeneous
brick performance.
Upon startup, each brick is configured with an RGID-
mask pair, which it beacons periodically to distribute
metadata and indicate liveness. For example, if brick B
beacons (1, 11), this tells Dlib’s to use the last two bits
of the key to find B’s RGID, 01. Using this information,
Dlibs build a soft-state RGID-to-brick mapping (RGID
map); to find the replica group storing a given key, Dlibs
find the entry with the longest matching suffix.
The beaconing period is a system-configurable param-
eter (currently set to two seconds), so in between bea-
cons, a Dlib’s RGID map may become stale. Since each
brick is the ultimate authority of its own RGID, if a Dlib
sends a request to the wrong brick, the brick returns a
WRONG REPLICA GROUP error. Once the Dlib’s RGID map
is updated on the next beaconing period, the request is
sent to the correct set of bricks. Finally, a brick can be a
part of more than one replica group by announcing mul-
tiple RGIDs. This feature is used to spread load across a
heterogeneous set of bricks and in the online repartition-
ing algorithm described later in this section.
4.2 Detailed algorithms
DStore’s put and get algorithms, which were outlined
earlier, are described here in full detail. For this discus-
sion, let N be the number of bricks in a replica group,
let WT (write threshold) be the minimum number of
bricks that must reply before a put returns, and let RT
(read threshold) be the minimum number of bricks that
are queried on a get. In DStore, we choose WT and RT
to be a majority – ⌈(N+1)/2⌉; however, in general,WT
and RT can be chosen such that the read and write sets
intersect: WT +RT > N .3
Dlib put: On a put, the Dlib generates a physical
timestamp from its local clock and appends its IP ad-
dress. The timestamped value is sent to the entire replica
group, but the Dlib only waits for the first WT responses
to ensure the quorum majority invariant holds, and ig-
nores any subsequent responses. Pseudocode for all al-
gorithms are provided in the appendix.
Brick write: When a brick receives a write request,
it overwrites a value only if the new value has a more
recent timestamp. If the new timestamp is older than the
current timestamp by ∆ts, which is set to 1 millisecond,
the brick returns TIMESTAMP ERROR.
Dlib get: On a get, the Dlib selectsRT random bricks
from the replica group, and issues a read val request to
one brick and read ts requests to the remaining RT − 1
bricks. After the value and all the timestamps are re-
turned, the Dlib calls the check method to confirm that
the value is up to date.
Dlib check: On each get, two checks are performed
on the timestamps. First, the Dlib checks whether the
timestamp for value is the most recent one returned. If
it is, value is returned; otherwise, the value is read from
the brick that returned the most recent timestamp. Sec-
ond, the Dlib checks whether at leastWT bricks have the
most recent timestamp. If not, the most recent value and
3Quorum systems generally also require that 2 ∗WT > N so that
simultaneous writes can be ordered; however, we use physical times-
tamps, which eliminates this requirement.
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timestamp are written back to ensure that enough bricks
contain an up-to-date value. This repair mechanism is
used to repair partial writes arising from Dlib failures.
4.3 Restart mechanism
The final implementation detail we discuss is the brick
recovery mechanism, which is used by the failure detec-
tion mechanisms described later. To restart a failed brick
Bf , a Dlib scans its RGID map for the brick with the
next-highest IP address Br, and sends a RESTART BRICK
message to Br’s control channel. If Br does not respond
because it too has failed, the brick with the next-highest
IP address is asked to restart both bricks. The Dlib also
removes Bf from its RGID map so that requests are not
sent to Bf until it recovers.
To restart the brick, Br runs a script that first sends
a kill -9 to Bf ’s brick processes. Next, the script at-
tempts to restart the brick processes. If instead, Bf ’s ma-
chine does not respond at all, the node can be restarted
using an IP-addressable power source. Since multiple
Dlibs are likely to detect Bf ’s failure, Br does not per-
form recovery more than once every four seconds (two
times the beaconing interval). Further, since restarting a
brick only cures transient failures, if the brick has been
restarted more than a threshold number of times in a
given period, it is assumed the brick has a persistent fault
and should be taken offline. Automatically reconstruct-
ing data after disk failures and allowing failed compo-
nents to be replaced en-masse, say on a weekly basis, are
next steps in our future work.
5 Recovery benchmarks
In this section, we evaluate how well DStore achieves
its goal of cheap recovery. We first measure basic per-
formance and scalability, and then show system behavior
during failure and recovery.
5.1 Benchmark details
All benchmarks are run on the UC Berkeley Millen-
nium cluster, which has 42 PCs with dual 1GHz Pentium
III CPUs, 1.5GB RAM, and dual 36GB IBM UltraStar
36LZX hard drives. Nodes are connected by a 100Mb/s
switched Ethernet. A single instance of a brick or client
application is run on each node using Sun’s JDK 1.4.1
on top of Linux 2.4.18. DStore is configured with three
bricks per replica group (N = 3) and 1-KByte records.
The number of threads allocated to service the write,
read val, and read ts queues is 14, 32, and 10 respec-
tively, which produces a workload mix of around 2.5 to 5
percent writes. To generate load, clients perform closed-
loop operations4 on random keys and 1-KByte values;
4closed-loop = a new request is immediately issued after the previ-
ous request returns
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Figure 8: ROWA vs. Quorums: Under realistic cache hit rates, read-
ing extra timestamps from an in-memory in quorums has little effect on
performance because the disk is the bottleneck.
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Figure 9: Linear scaling: GET and PUT throughput scale linearly
with the number of bricks (cache hit rate = 85%).
this 1-KByte value size falls within the range of typical
hash table object sizes in Internet services [35]. Enough
clients are run to saturate the bricks in steady-state and
when there are concurrent reads and writes, the ratio of
read clients to write clients is 4:1; however, as shown
below, the GET and PUT throughput capacities are inde-
pendent of the workload mix and are instead determined
by the number of threads allocated to each request queue.
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5.2 Steady-state performance
Although designed for manageability, DStore retains
the high performance and scalability of CHTs. First,
we show that under reasonable cache hit rates, the read-
timestamp optimization gives quorums read performance
comparable to ROWA. Second, we show that DStore
throughput scales linearly with the number of bricks.
Timestamp read overhead. To evaluate the effective-
ness of DStore’s read-timestamp optimization, we com-
pare the read performance of ROWA versus quorums un-
der different cache hit rates. We run a three-brick DStore
with 2GB of data and induce approximate cache hit rates
between 60 and 100 percent. The client induces a hit rate
c by generating a random integer i between 1 and 100 on
each request. If i ≤ c, the key k is chosen to fall within
the 1.2GB working set: 0 ≤ k < 1.2M . If i > c, k is
chosen to induce a disk access: 1.2M ≤ k < 2M .
Figure 8 shows that although ROWA outperforms
7
0100
200
300
400
 0  5  10  15  20  25  30
PU
T 
re
q/
se
c
Time (minutes)
PU
T 
re
q/
se
c
0
100
200Repairs/sec0K
2K
4K
6K
8K
G
ET
 re
q/
se
c
G
ET
 re
q/
se
c
(a) Unrealistic cache hit rate
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(b) Expected recovery throughput
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Figure 10: Recovery behavior: In (a), under a 100% cache hit rate, recovery is neither fast nor non-intrusive because of the disparity between
disk-bound recovery performance and in-core steady-state performance. In (b) and (c), under a realistic cache hit rate of 85%, the extra disk
accesses from a small number of read repair operations does not greatly affect throughput or latency because the steady-state performance is already
disk-bound.
DStore when the working set fits in memory, the disk
quickly becomes the bottleneck for lower, more realis-
tic cache hit rates and performing the extra timestamp
read becomes largely insignificant. If timestamps do not
completely fit in memory, the 100-percent cache hit rate
measurements can be seen as the worst-case overhead.
Linear performance scaling. To evaluate DStore’s
scaling properties, we induce an 85-percent cache hit rate
as described above and measure GET and PUT through-
put separately. Figure 9 shows throughput scaling lin-
early up to 21 bricks for GETs and 27 bricks for PUTs
after which, we did not have enough nodes to scale the
benchmark further.
5.3 Fast, non-intrusive recovery
Next, we show that recovery is fast and leaves data
available for reads and writes throughout failure and re-
covery. For these benchmarks, we run a three-brick
DStore, induce a brick failure at t = 5min, and man-
ually restart the brick at t = 10min. For these and all
subsequent benchmarks, we show the get/put through-
put and the repair operations per second. The shaded ar-
eas highlight the period a brick is offline, either due to a
failure, reboot, or to intentionally stop receiving requests
like during repartitioning. Each point in the graph rep-
resents a single throughput measurement (taken once per
second) as seen from the clients.
Figure 10(a) shows recovery behavior under a 100-
percent cache hit rate. As expected, get throughput
drops by one third during failure and put throughput
remains steady because writes are issued to the entire
replica group causing bricks to see roughly the same load
no matter how many bricks are available. After the brick
recovers, get throughput drops dramatically because of
the requests that require repair. Although the percentage
of repairs is small, the high cost of disk writes causes
reads to become disk-bound. Since repair operations are
placed in the bricks’ write queues, contention causes put
throughput to drop as well. Throughput returns to nor-
mal only after about ten minutes. The dramatic drop in
throughput capacity that takes ten minutes to restore can
hardly be considered fast and non-intrusive.
According to an industry expert, workloads for large
data sets are typically disk-bound with cache hit rates
ranging from 60 to 90 percent [35]. As shown in Fig-
ures 10(b) and (c), recovery behavior changes signifi-
cantly when the workload induces a more realistic cache
hit rate of 85%. As in the previous benchmark, through-
put drops during failure for get requests, but not put re-
quests. In fact, put throughput rises slightly due to the
slight drop in contention from get requests requiring disk
access. On recovery, get throughput immediately returns
to normal because the small number of repair operations
has little effect on the already disk-bound workload. put
throughput drops due to contention from repair requests;
however, the effect is less pronounced because in steady-
state, put and get requests already contend for the disk.
In 10(c), as expected, get latency increases when the
brick fails because the same load is being handled by
fewer bricks. On recovery, put latency increases due to
an increased write load from repair operations. In gen-
eral, the longer the brick failure, the more read-repair op-
erations are required and the more contention there will
be on the disk for put requests. Whereas in ROWA where
writes are frozen while data is copied, this benchmark
shows that the read-repair mechanism spreads the cost of
recovery over time with modest performance impact.
6 Simple, aggressive failure detection
Two failure detection mechanisms can cause DStore
to initiate brick recovery as described earlier in Section
4. First, Dlibs initiate recovery if a brick misses two
consecutive RGID beaconing periods. This simple bea-
coning mechanism is usually sufficient to detect stopping
failures like node crashes, or faults that can be mapped
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(c) Pinpoint – aggressive policy
Figure 11: Fast failure detection: In each benchmark, failure or degradation is induced at t = 5min. In (a), beacon-based detection immediately
detects the brick failure. In (b), when anomalythreshold = 8, Pinpoint detects brick degradation after a slight dip in overall system performance.
In (c), when anomalythreshold = 5, Pinpoint detects the degraded brick earlier and even though it also raises false positives, due to the low cost
of recovery overall performance is not seriously affected.
to stopping failures using fault-model enforcement, like
certain types of memory corruption and bit flips [34].
Whereas stopping failures are relatively easy to detect,
fail-stutter is difficult to detect reliably because it is hard
to determine if degradation is due to faulty component or
some other factor like garbage collection or cache warm-
ing. To detect fail-stutter behavior and other anomalous
behaviors that may be indicative of a current or pending
failure, a brick periodically reports operating statistics,
which are compared to the operating statistics of other
bricks to detect deviant behavior. If a brick’s operating
statistic deviates by more than a certain deviation thresh-
old, an anomaly is raised. If the number of anomalies for
one brick exceeds a certain anomaly threshold, the brick
is restarted. The set of operating statistics bricks report
is listed below.
Statistic Description
CPU load Load average as reported by uptime
Memory usage Memory usage as reported by free
Queue length Current GET, PUT, TS queue lengths
Success GET, PUT, TS requests processed since last report
Dropped GET, PUT, TS requests dropped since last report
Queue delay Queuing delay EMA (exponential moving average,
α = .0002) for each queue type
Latency Request processing time EMA (α = .0002)
for each request type
We use two statistical methods for generating a model
of “good behavior” and detecting anomalies. The first
method is median absolute deviation, which compares
one brick’s current behavior with that of the majority of
the system. This metric was chosen for its robustness
to outliers in small populations, which is important for
small DStore installations. The second method is the
Tarzan algorithm [23] for analyzing time series, which
incorporates a brick’s past behavior and compares it with
that of the rest of the bricks. For every statistic of each
brick, we keep an N-length history, or time-series, of the
state and discretize it into a binary string. To discover
anomalies, Tarzan counts the relative frequencies of all
substrings shorter than k within these binary strings. If
a brick’s discretized timeseries has an abnormally high
or low frequency of some substring as compared to the
other bricks, an anomaly is raised. We set k = 3,
N = 100, deviation threshold to 0.5, and we vary the
anomaly threshold.
We note that although such methods are potentially
powerful tools for identifying deviant behavior, identi-
fying the “best” algorithms to use is a non-goal of this
work. Rather, our goal is to demonstrate that DStore’s
cheap recovery allows us to take advantage of these
relatively simple, application-generic techniques: even
though anomalous conditions may be false positives that
predict an eventual brick failure, the low cost of recovery
enables us to act on some false positives without serious
adverse affects. In fact, at times, it may be beneficial to
reboot a brick even if an anomaly is transient.
6.1 Failure detection benchmarks
These benchmarks show how DStore takes advantage
of cheap recovery to detect stopping and slow-down fail-
ures using aggressive failure detection. For these, and
all future benchmarks, we induce an 85-percent cache
hit rate. Also, since latency results are qualitatively very
similar to those shown in Figure 10c, for all remaining
benchmarks, we show only throughput graphs.
In the first benchmark, we run a three-brick DStore
and kill one brick at t = 5min. Figure 11(a) shows that
DStore’s beacon-based detection detects the stopping
failure and restores full capacity within about a minute.
To evaluate DStore’s statistical anomaly-detection mech-
anisms, in the next two benchmarks, we run a six-brick
DStore and at t = 5min, gradually degrade one brick’s
throughput capacity by increasing its request process-
ing latency. We model degradation as lost CPU cycles,
which is reasonable for slow downs due to memory leaks
and virtual memory thrashing. We simulate degradation
by performing extraneous floating point operations be-
fore processing each request, the number of which is in-
creased every ten seconds.
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Figures 11(b) and 11(c) show failure detection with
varying degrees of aggressiveness. Recall that the
anomaly threshold corresponds to the number of brick
statistics that must indicate deviant behavior before a
brick is rebooted. By trial-and-error, we selected two
thresholds, one that showed some system degradation be-
fore recovery was initiated, and another that caused spu-
rious reboots in bricks in which we did not inject faults.
With an anomaly threshold of 8, DStore detects the in-
jected slow-down failure and reboots the node after a
small, but noticeable degradation in system performance.
With a more aggressive policy where the threshold is set
to 5, the degrading brick is caught more quickly, but
DStore also reboots other bricks in which no faults in-
jected; however, as discussed before, the low cost of act-
ing on false positives allows us to use aggressive failure
detection without worrying about the extra reboots.
These benchmarks show that with cheap recovery, ef-
fective failure detection does not require the best algo-
rithms with highly-tuned parameters that reliably detect
failures without raising false positives. Instead, aggres-
sive anomaly-detection can be used in DStore for effec-
tive, low-cost failure handling.
6.2 Remarks on rolling reboots
Along with beacon-based and statistical anomaly-
based failure detection, cheap recovery enables a third,
complementary failure handling mechanism – rolling re-
boots. By proactively rebooting bricks, software rejuve-
nation [20] can prevent failures that arise due to aging ef-
fects like memory leaks. Although rolling reboots catch a
superset of the problems we can detect using beacons and
statistical anomaly-detection, DStore detects and deals
with failures more quickly than if we had to wait for the
reboot to cycle to the affected brick. Thus, all three are
complementary mechanisms.
7 Zero-downtime incremental scaling
Cheap recovery is the basis for our online repartition-
ing algorithm. Currently, repartitioning is initiated when
an administrator issues a command with the new bricks’
hostnames to add the new bricks; however, DStore is
amenable to systems that monitor workload and pre-
dict resource utilization to automatically decide when to
bring more resources online [27]. Once the new bricks
are added, deciding which bricks to repartition and inte-
grating the new bricks into the system is handled auto-
matically.
7.1 Repartitioning algorithm
The steps in our automatic, online repartitioning algo-
rithm are as follows:
1. Discover replica group information. The new brick,
Bnew constructs an RGID map by listening to
RGID beacons.
2. Select the brick to repartition. Bnew listens for Dlib
latency beacons and selects the repartition brick Br
based on average request latency.
3. Split Br’s replica group. Bnew sends a SPLIT RG
command to the control channel of each brick in
Br’s replica group. A brick logically splits its RGID
by adding an extra bit and announcing two RGID’s;
for example, if Br’s current RGID is 0, it begins
announcing both 00 and 10. Bnew listens for up-
dated RGID beacons from Br’s replica group to
make sure all bricks have split before continuing.
00 10 00 10 00 10
4. Take Br offline. Bnew sends an OFFLINE command
to Br. Br attaches an “offline” flag to its RGID
beacons causing Dlibs to stop sending requests to
Br. From the point of view of the Dlibs, it appears
as if Br has failed; the only difference is that the
Dlibs do not initiate recovery.
00 10 00 10 00 10
5. Copy data from Br to Bnew.
00 10 00 10 00 10 10
6. Set Br’s and Bnew’s RGIDs via their control chan-
nels, and bring both online. RGID’s are set so that
the partition is physically split: RGID(Br) = 00
and RGID(Bnew) = 10.
00 10 00 10 00 10
First, consider the algorithm’s online aspect. Taking
Br offline and bringing it back online has the same ef-
fect as ifBr had failed and recovered; the only difference
is that upon “recovery,” two physical bricks have taken
Br’s place. Therefore, any updates that occur during
repartitioning are executed by the online bricks with up-
dates being propagated to the offline bricks via the read-
repair mechanism. Since repartitioning has the same ef-
fect as a failure, when multiple bricks are added to the
same replica group, they are integrated into the system
one at a time. If a failure occurs while repartitioning and
the number of online bricks falls below a majority, the
repartitioning process is halted and Br is brought back
online. The resulting effect is no different than if the Br
had simply failed and recovered. Although it is possi-
ble to add bricks simultaneously without taking bricks
offline by adjusting the read and write thresholds accord-
ingly, we use this recovery-based mechanism because it
makes the performance impact and time for adding new
bricks more predictable.
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(a) Basic repartitioning behavior
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(b) Handling hot spots
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(c) “Plug-and-play” scaling
Figure 12: Online repartitioning: In (a), three bricks are added to a three-brick DStore to double throughput without causing unavailability. In
(b), six bricks are added to a six-brick DStore in which clients induce a data hotspot in keys ending in 00 to show that the latency-based scheme for
making partitioning decisions produces higher performance than a naive approach, which is shown by the dashed line. In (c), repartitioning is used
to scales DStore from 3 to 24 bricks in an automatic, fully-online fashion.
Second, consider the automatic aspect of the algo-
rithm. DStore’s simple hash table API removes implicit
data dependences, which enables our algorithm to select
Br based solely on load information without worrying
about splitting up data that is accessed together. The
generalized form of the algorithm is to globally repar-
tition the system by selecting the N most loaded bricks
and moving portions of the keyspace to the new brick as
necessary; however, for simplicity, the current algorithm
splits only the heaviest-loaded brick, approximated by
the exponential-moving-average request latency with a
smoothing constant α = 0.5.
7.2 Repartitioning benchmarks
These benchmarks show that repartitioning, like re-
covery, has a predictably small impact on availability
and performance. We first show basic repartitioning be-
havior by running a three-brick DStore and doubling the
number of bricks by adding a brick every ten minutes.
In Figure 12(a), the first two shaded areas are similar
to brick failure and recovery. The slight throughput in-
crease at the end of the gray area results from the original
brick coming back online before the new brick preloads
its timestamp table and starts up (analogous to cache
warming). After two bricks are added, the throughput
increase is slight because capacity is limited by the non-
partitioned brick. Load-based request distribution would
enable DStore to take advantage of the spare capacity of
the repartitioned portions of the replica group by biasing
where requests are sent. While the third brick is repar-
titioned, throughput rises because the rate-limiting brick
is removed, leaving the system with two replica groups
each with two bricks. After the third brick is reparti-
tioned, throughput climbs up to a new steady-state level,
approximately double the original level.
The second benchmark shows that the latency-based
brick-selection scheme handles hotspots by repartition-
ing the most heavily-loaded bricks. In Figure 12(b),
we start with a six-brick DStore and two replica groups,
RGID = 0 and RGID = 1. Rather than spreading re-
questing evenly across the keyspace, clients request keys
in a biased fashion, producing a data hotspot in keys end-
ing in 00. Three bricks are added at t = 10m to split the
0 partition. This addition brings the throughput to the
same level as a naive partitioning in which the replica
groups are split evenly across the entire keyspace while
the 00 remained heavily overloaded (represented by the
dashed line). Instead, when the second set of bricks is
added at t = 50m, DStore splits the 00 partition into 000
and 100 to achieve much higher performance.
In the final benchmark, we use online repartitioning
to scale DStore up to 24 bricks. In Figure 12(c), going
from three to six bricks doubles throughput; however,
throughput does not double as expected, at 12 bricks.
Observing the brick statistics collected for failure detec-
tion shows some bricks consistently exhibiting relatively
poor performance despite equivalent hardware/software
configurations. As described in [1], performance vari-
ations can arise in a homogenous cluster due to differ-
ences in disk layout and memory management; this ef-
fect is particularly acute in I/O-bound workloads. As is
the case when repartitioning a single replica group, the
throughput increase follows a step function rather than a
linear one. This is due to the fact that before the num-
ber of bricks is doubled, only part of the keyspace has
been partitioned while requests remain evenly distributed
across the keyspace. Global repartitioning would pro-
duce a greater throughput increase for each incremen-
tal brick addition; however, unlike the evenly-distributed
workload of this benchmark, we expect real workloads
to grow unevenly causing some bricks to become over-
loaded before others; therefore, it is often effective to
simply add a new node for each overloaded brick.
Resource provisioning is made simpler when the time
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to bring new resources online is predictable and that re-
souces can be introduced into the system without signifi-
cantly disturbing the behavior of existing resources [27].
With its cheap recovery, DStore satisfies both of these as-
sumptions, which further shows that cheap recovery pro-
vides a significant point of leverage for experimenting
with more techniques like these.
8 Discussion and future work
In this section, we wrap up the discussion on adminis-
tration costs and discuss future work.
8.1 Reducing administration costs
Certain kinds of Internet service data, such as billing
information, require the transactional semantics and
query generality of a relational database. By using a
CHT for data that requires durability but can tolerate our
relaxed consistency model and does not need to support
complex queries, one can reduce the size of the rela-
tional database installation, and therefore its administra-
tion cost. The overhead in setting up and managing the
CHT in addition to an existing database is compensated
by the extreme ease of administering the CHT even at
large scale.
8.2 Future work
One area of future work involves using cheap recov-
ery to evaluate different failure detection techniques and
parameters. The low cost of acting on false positives en-
ables us to replace the manual parameter-tuning process
with one that discovers more optimal parameters auto-
matically in a similar trial-and-error fashion. A second
area of future work involves handling permanent disk
failures. With hundreds to thousands of disks, large-scale
Internet services replace disks frequently. Rather than re-
quiring immediate replacement, it is important to tolerate
a brick being down for several days or more. Once the
brick is replaced, the system must automatically integrate
the new brick into the system, reconstructing data from
the live bricks as necessary.
9 Related Work
Motivating our work, Distributed Data Structures [15]
is a scalable, high-performance CHT, which uses
ROWA and two-phase commit. Session State Manage-
ment [29], which shares DStore’s self-managing goals,
is an in-memory CHT that provides non-concurrent-
access, semi-persistent storage for session state. Berke-
ley DB [3], which can serve as underlying storage for
DStore bricks, is a single-node hash table that can be
replicated using a primary-secondary scheme, but does
not provide a single-system image across a cluster.
Brick-based disk storage systems are low-cost alter-
natives to high-end RAID [7] disk arrays. Federated
Array of Bricks [10] uses quorums and a non-locking
two-phase protocol to ensure linearizability. To achieve
ease of management and performance, RepStore [45]
uses self-organizing capabilities of P2P DHTs and a
self-tuning mechanism that replicates frequently-written
data, but trades write performance for storage by erasure-
coding read-mostly data. In contrast to distributed disk
and file systems [28, 11, 45, 39] with similar self-
management goals, DStore exploits specific workload
characteristics for consistency management and exposes
a higher-level interface with guarantees on variable-sized
elements. Similarly, the Google File System [12] is
designed for its large-file, append-mostly workload to
achieve scalability and manageability.
Consistency is traded for performance and availabil-
ity [4, 44], and quorums [13] provide availability un-
der network partitions [8] and Byzantine faults [32, 36];
however, DStore uses quorums and trades consistency
for extremely simple persistent state management. Like
DStore, Coda [24] tolerates replica inconsistency, but
in a non-transparent fashion. Bayou’s [38] Monotonic
Reads and Read-Your-Writes provide guarantees similar
to those provided by DStore’s read-repair and write-in-
progress cookie mechanisms; however, Bayou’s makes
guarantees for a single user session, not across users. The
Porcupine Mail Server [37] has self-management goals,
but its eventual consistency guarantees allow users to see
data waver between old and new values before replicas
eventually become consistent.
Finally, DStore owes its statistical failure detection to
Pinpoint [6], a comprehensive, ongoing investigation of
anomaly-based failure detection.
10 Conclusion
We combined two techniques—quorums to tolerate
replica inconsistency and single-phase operations to
avoid locking—to make reboot-based recovery fast and
non-intrusive in a cluster-based hash table. One conse-
quence of this cheap recovery is that we successfully ap-
plied aggressive statistical anomaly-based failure detec-
tion to automatically detect and recover from both fail-
stop and fail-stutter transients. Furthermore, we used the
same recovery mechanism to solve the distinct problem
of incremental scaling without service interruption. The
net result is a state store that can be managed with the
same types of simple mechanisms and policies as used
for stateless frontends.
Taking a larger view, we believe cheap recovery is
an important design pattern for self-managing systems:
when recovery is predictably fast and has predictably
small impact on system availability and performance,
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the line between “normal” and “recovery” operation be-
comes blurred. This makes it acceptable for the system
to be constantly “recovering,” a key property of self-
managing, autonomic systems.
A Appendix: Algorithm pseudocode
put(key, value, ts)
1 if (ts == NULL)
2 ts = generate_timestamp()
3 foreach b in <replica group bricks>
4 send(b, WRITE, key, val, ts)
5 for (c = 0 to WT-1)
6 err = receive(WT_RESP, WT_TIMEOUT)
7 if (err == TIMEOUT)
8 return TIMEOUT
write(key, value, ts)
1 current_ts = read_ts(key)
2 if (ts > current_ts)
3 WRITE(key, value, ts)
4 else if (ts < current_ts - DELTA)
5 return TIMESTAMP_ERROR
6 return SUCCESS
get(key)
1 rset[0...RT-1] = choose_bricks(RT)
2 send(rset[0], READ_VAL, key)
3 for (i = 1 to RT-1)
4 send(rset[i], READ_TS, key)
5 for (i = 1 to RT-1)
6 err = receive(TS_RESP, ts[i], RD_TIMEOUT)
7 if (err == TIMEOUT)
8 return TIMEOUT
9 err = receive(VAL_RESP, ts[0], value, RD_TIMEOUT)
10 if (err = TIMEOUT)
11 return TIMEOUT
12 return check(key, value, ts[], rset[])
check(key, value, ts[], rset[])
1 {maxts, index} = findmax(ts[])
2 timeouts = 0
3 if (ts[0] != maxts)
4 send(rset[index], READ_VAL, key)
5 err = receive(VAL_RESP, value, maxts, RD_TIMEOUT)
6 if (err == TIMEOUT)
7 return TIMEOUT
8 for (i = 0 to RT-1)
9 if (ts[i] != maxts)
10 send(rset[i], WRITE, key, value, maxts)
11 err = receive(WT_RESP, WT_TIMEOUT)
12 if (err != TIMEOUT)
13 timeouts++
14 if (RT - timeouts < WT)
15 put(key, value, maxts)
16 return value
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